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Abstract: The main aim of this study is to empirically investigate the factors influencing the capital structure decisions of 
listed firms in Ghana. In examining the determinants of capital structure, 28 firms listed on the Ghana Stock Exchange were 
used for a time period of 8years, spanning from 2007-2014. We employed a dynamic panel system of General Methods of 
Moments (GMM) in testing the hypotheses. The results from the empirical estimation revealed that listed firms in Ghana use 
less debt that equity and they prefer using short-term debt rather than long-term debt in financing their operations. The study 
also finds a significant positive relationship between tangibility of firms, liquidity, managerial ownership, firm size and long-
term debt ratio. However, we find that profitability, growth opportunities, firm age, and business risk relate negatively with 
long-term debt ratio for listed firms in Ghana.  
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1. Introduction 
Capital structure is a very important concept in corporate world and managers take decisions daily 
concerning the optimal capital structure of firms that maximize the wealth of shareholders. This 
certainly led to the pioneering work of Modigliani and Miller (1958) on capital structure irrelevance. 
Since their seminal work, several theories including the trade-off theory by Modigliani and Miller 
(1963) and Miller (1977) and the pecking order theory by Myers and Majluf (1984) and Myers (1984) 
have evolved. All these subsequent theories have been conclusive and lent their supports for the 
relevance of capital structure contrary to the seminal works of Modigliani and Myer (1958). Despite of 
their massive support for the relevance of capital structure, they all have different lines of arguments. 
For instance while the trade-off theory places emphasis on taxes as major determinant of optimal 
capital structure for firms, the pecking order sees information asymmetry as a key determinant of the 
capital structure. These theories have been empirically tested severally.  
However, most of the studies have been confined to Asia and the western world4 to the neglect of 
African countries like Ghana notwithstanding the important role the subject matter plays in the 
corporate world. In Ghana, only few studies have delved into the subject matter5. These few studies 
have however got varied findings and hence the need for more studies on the subject matter in Ghana.  
This work however departs from the previous studies carried out in Ghana in the following ways. 
First, unlike the previous studies, this study has employed a very robust dynamic panel system GMM 
to cure the problem of endogeneity which has the potential of generating inconsistent results in 
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estimations. Secondly, unlike previous studies that have used only the book value measure of debt, this 
study has employed both the book and market measures of debt in the capital structure examination 
thus making our results more robust. Finally, this work is making use of more firms and time period 
than previous studies following the expansion of the GSE in recent times thus there is higher degree of 
freedom in this work which can lead to better results than previous work. The remainder of the study 
is structured in the following way. Section 2 reviews the theories and the empirical literature on the 
determinants of capital structure while section 3 focuses on the data and methodological issues. 
Section 4 presents the discussions on the regression results while section 5 delved with the conclusion 
and recommendations of the study.  
 
2. Literature Review 
This section is devoted to the review of literature relevant to capital structure. We first reviewed the 
theoretical literature on capital structure followed by empirical literature on the determinants of capital 
structure.  
2.1. Theories on Capital Structure 
Capital structure is the specific mixture of debt and equity finance that a firm uses in its operations 
(Abor, 2008). Several theories have emerged on the preference of firms for debt over equity, the right 
mixture or equity over debt in order to maximize shareholders’ wealth. The genesis of capital theories 
can be traced to the seminal work of Modigliani and Miller (1958). In their theory known as “capital 
structure irrelevance”, they believe that in perfect capital market without taxes and with no agency 
cost, any mixture of debt and equity is good and hence will not affect the firm’s value. However, in the 
real world where there are imperfect market conditions, traction costs, taxes and heterogeneous 
expectations, this theory does not work. This means therefore that capital structure is very crucial in 
determining the value of firm. Based on this two major theories involved and they are explained 
below.  
Trade-off Theory 
This theory propounded by Modigliani and Miller (1963) and Miller (1977) argued that with the 
existence of taxes on firms, it will be advantageous for a firm to hold more debt than equity as firm 
stands the chance of getting tax deduction from interest on debt unlike gains from equity in the forms 
of dividends and capital gains that are taxable. In order to take the advantage of this tax effect, firms 
will be better of increasing their debt ratio. Miller (1977) and Myers (2001) indicated that in desire of 
firms to increase their debt portfolio, interest on debt will certainly rise thus leading to more interest 
cost on the firm which can however ultimately be offset by the higher interest tax deductible. The 
optimum capital is thus depended on the net off tax effect. The trade-off theory however has two 
major costs including bankruptcy cost and agency cost.  
Bankruptcy costs as defined by Abor (2008) are costs which occur when the perceived probability that 
the firm will default is greater than zero. Bankruptcy cost is made up of direct and indirect costs. 
Direct costs refer to professional fees in the form of lawyers’ fees, accountants’ fees, other 
professional charges and administrative costs on bankruptcy. On the other hand, indirect costs refer to 
lost sales, lost profits, loss of credits or the inability to issue securities unless under unfavourable 
conditions. As a firm maximize its value by increasing its debt (Modigliani & Miller, 1963), its 
bankruptcy probability also increases as the fear that it might not be able to finance its debts (Titman, 
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1984). Thus the optimal capital structure represents debt level that balances bankruptcy costs and debt 
finance benefits (Abor, 2008).  
Besides the bankruptcy cost, the use of debt in financing firms also leads to agency cost. This cost 
stems from relationship between shareholders and managers and that between debt holders and 
shareholders (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). In these relationships, while managers are agents, both 
shareholders and debt holders are principals. Conflicts between shareholders and managers arise 
because in most cases the ownership of business is distinct from the management or in some cases 
though managers do have ownership, they do not have 100% ownership, however they have complete 
control over the day-to-day running of the firm and the control over all its resources. In this case, 
managers take decisions that will maximize their interest to the neglect of the shareholders’ interest. 
This inefficiency tendency level is argued to reduce with increase in managers’ equity in the firm 
(Sheikh & Wang, 2011). Conflict between debt-holders and shareholders is believed to only arise 
when there is a risk of default (Myers, 2001). A situation where there is no default risk debt-holders 
are not worried about the behavior or actions of the firm. However, where there is an eminent default 
risk if managers are acting in the interest of shareholders, they are likely going to take decisions that 
will favour the shareholders to the neglect of the debt-holders interest. For instance managers can 
invest in riskier ventures. In the attempt to avoid this, debt-holders will incorporate in their debt 
contracts terms that will increase the cost of the debt or deter managers from involving in acts that will 
be disastrous to the debt-holders.  
Under the trade-off theory which has bankruptcy and agency costs as its basis, firms take upon debt up 
to a point where the tax saving from taking extra debt are equal to the costs emanating from the 
increased probability of finance distress(Sheikh & Wang, 2011). This certainly implies that firms in 
their attempt to maximize value set some optimal capital structure so as to increase shareholders 
wealth.  
Pecking Order 
This theory was propounded by Myers and Majluf (1984) and Myers (1984). The theory places 
emphasis on information asymmetry as a basis for the choice of capital structure by a firm. Conditions 
upon which this theory is based are; that managers are acting in the interest of the shareholders and 
that managers are more informed than outsiders about the prospects of the firm. Given that these 
conditions are met, firms will prefer to use retained earnings over debt if available and will prefer 
taking on debt also over issuing of new equities. New equities are seen as a last resort that firms will 
go in for as financing instrument. Thus firms that generate more profit will prefer to use internal funds 
and hence will use less debt. Pecking order theory also posits that with information asymmetry, higher 
growth opportunities in firm, means higher risks and hence such firm has the chance in raising debt. 
Firms with higher growth opportunities will have low debt as capital (Pratheepan & Banda, 2016).  
2.2. Determinants of Capital Structure and Hypotheses Development 
Following the theoretical debates on capital structure ignited by Modigliani and Miller (1958), several 
empirical studies have delved into the determinants of capital structure. As identified by most of the 
empirical studies, we have reviewed the following as the determinants of capital structure: 
profitability, age, size, business risk, asset structure, non-debt tax shield, growth opportunities, 
managerial ownership and liquidity.  
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Profitability 
Following the seminal work of Modigliani and Miller (1958), several theories have emerged with 
varied views on the relationship between profitability of firm and use of debt. While the pecking order 
postulates that higher profit leads to low debt as internal funds are viewed to be cheaper source of 
capital than debt, the trade-off theories suggest to the contrary that profitable firms will take on more 
debts so as to maximize on their benefits of tax shields on interest payments. Several studies have 
established the inverse relationship between profitability and leverage thus supporting the pecking 
order theory1. It is therefore hypothesized that: 
H1a. Profitability is negatively related to long-term debt ratio 
H1b. Profitability is negatively related to short-term debt ratio 
Age 
Age of a firm is noted to be a measure of reputation (Diamond, 1989) thus the older a firm is the 
higher credit worthy it is. Older firms are believed to have built on their image over the years thus are 
more prudent in their investment choices than younger firms. This is also attributable to the 
experiences they have gained over the years through decisions making and hence they have the ability 
to make good choices. Using 160 SMEs in Ghana, Abor and Biekpe (2007) found that age has a 
significantly positive correlation with both short-term debt ratio and long-term debt ratio. These 
findings were supported by the works of Akhtar and Oliver (2009) using evidence from Japanese 
firms. Contrary to these findings, Abor (2008) established a negative relationship between age and 
long-term debt when he did a comparative study on quoted and unquoted firms in Ghana. Based on 
this the following hypotheses are formulated: 
H2a. Age of firm is positively related to long-term debt ratio; 
H2b. Age of firm is positively related to short-term debt ratio. 
Firm Size 
Arguably larger firms are noted to disclose information to outsiders more than smaller firms (Fama & 
Jensen, 1983; Rajan & Zingales, 1995). With the absence of information asymmetry, larger firms are 
able to attract long-term debt than smaller firms. Besides, with an economy of scale advantage on the 
part of large firms they have good bargains on credits thus getting long term debt. For these reasons it 
is argued that smaller firms are more likely to depend on equity while large firm use more debt 
(Barton et al, 1989; Sogorb-Mira, 2005). Empirically studies have confirmed this positive relationship 
between size and long-term debt (Huang & Song 2006; Abor & Biekpe, 2007; Akhtar & Oliver, 2009; 
Sheikh & Wang, 2011; Pratheepan & Banda, 2016). In contrary, however, using 469 firms in the USA 
Titman and Wessels (1988) found that size and short-term debt ratio have negative relationship. 
Following these analysis we hypothesize that: 
H3a. Firm size is positively related long-term debt ratio; 
H3b. Firm size is negatively related short-term debt ratio. 
                                                     
1 See (Titman and Wessels, 1988; Sharpe, 1995; Huang and Song, 2006; Abor and Biekpe, 2007; Abor 2008; Akhtar and 
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Business Risk 
Theoretically, the relationship between business risk of a firm and its long-term debt is varied. 
Generally, it is expected that the higher the risk the firm has, the lower the amount of debt the firm 
will have since creditors will not be willing to give out credits to such firms. Hsia (1981) however 
posits that as the variance rate of a firm goes up it decreases the firm’s equity risk thus making the risk 
in totality to be low. This thus results to positive relationship between risk and leverage. In his study, 
Abor (2008) established negative relationship between risk and long-term debt but established positive 
relationship between risk and short-term debt. Other studies which also found positive relationship 
between leverage and business risk are Akhtar and Oliver (2009) and Sheikh and Wang (2011). Based 
on these we expect the following as hypotheses: 
H4a. Business Risk is positively related to long-term debt;  
H4b. Business Risk is positively related to short-term debt. 
Asset Structure 
Asset structure or tangibility is noted as one of the key determinants of capital structure. Due to the 
availability of collateral security for firms with higher tangibility, the lower the rates at which creditors 
are willing to give loans to them (Bradley et al., 1984). This has made it very easy for tangible firms to 
access long-term debt as against firms with low tangible assets. Many empirical studies have 
established the positive relationship between tangibility and long-term debt1. While Abor and Biekpe 
(2007) and Abor (2008) also established positive relationship between tangibility and long-term debt, 
they also realized that there is an inverse relationship between tangibility and short-term debt. On the 
contrary, using 160 firms in the Pakistan firms, Sheikh and Wang, (2011) found negative relationship 
between tangibility and long-term debt. Based on this background, we postulate that: 
H5a. Asset Structure is positively related to long-term debt ratio;  
H5b. Asset Structure is negatively related to short-term debt ratio.  
Non-debt Tax Shield 
Non-debt tax shields are the substitute of tax shields on debt financing (DAngelo & Masulis, 1980). 
All things being equal, firms with higher non-debt tax shields are expected to have less debt financing 
in its capital structure. This inverse relationship has been supported by many empirical findings2. Thus 
we hypothesis that: 
H6a. Non-debt tax shield is negatively related to long-term debt ratio; 
H6b. Non-debt tax shield is negatively related to short-term debt ratio.  
Growth Opportunities 
Both the trade-off theory and agency cost theory argued that there is a negative relationship between 
growth opportunities and long-term debt ratio (Sheikh & Wang, 2011). According to the trade-off 
theory, firms with higher growth opportunities are not able to access more debt due to their inability to 
collateralize their growth opportunities. Similarly, the agency cost theory predicts this negative 
relationship because firms with opportunities have greater chances of investing sub-optimally to the 
benefit of the shareholders to the detriment of the credit holders hence debt holder will be cautious in 
                                                     
1 See (Huang & Song 2006; Akhtar & Oliver, 2009).  
2 See (Huang &Song, 2006; Abor, 2008; Akhtar & Oliver, 2009).  
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granting debt to such firms. Several empirical findings have been found to confirmed these theoretical 
views1. On the contrary, Pratheepan and Banda (2016) established positive relationship between 
growth opportunities and leverage on the Sri Lankans listed firms. We thus expect the following as 
hypotheses: 
H7a. Growth Opportunities is negatively related to long-term debt ratio; 
H7b. Growth Opportunities is negatively related to short-term debt ratio. 
Managerial Ownership 
From the agency theory, total agency cost is minimized by the use of optimal structure of leverage and 
ownership (Jesen & Meckling, 1976; Jesen, 1986). It is implied that there is some relationship between 
ownership by managers and leverage. Bokpin et al (2009) have found evidence to support this positive 
relationship between managerial ownership and leverage. Other empirical evidence have however 
established contrary findings implying that firms with higher managerial ownership have less leverage 
(Huang & Song, 2006; Abor, 2008). Abor (2008) however found positive relationship with short-term 
debt. Based on this we formulate the following hypotheses: 
H8a. Managerial ownership is positively related to long-term debt ratio; 
H8b. Managerial ownership is positively related to short-term debt ratio.  
Liquidity 
As suggested by the pecking order theory firms will prefer to use internal funds first if they are 
available for their activities and will only resort to debt and issuing of new equities as last resorts 
respectively (Myers & Majluf, 1984; Myers, 1984). This means that firms that have high liquidity will 
certainly have low debt ratio. One of the reasons for the negative relationship is that the firm is 
observed as not having long-term debt investment opportunities so as to be in need of debt (Mouamer, 
2011). On the contrary, high liquidity also indicates that the firm has the ability to pay its debt and 
hence no risk of default. This shows a positive relationship between liquidity and leverage. 
Empirically, we have no evidence to prove any of these opinions hence we proposed the following 
hypotheses: 
H9a. Liquidity is negatively related to long-term debt; 
H9b. Liquidity is negatively related to short-term debt.  
 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1. Source of Data 
To determine the variables that influence capital structure of firms in Ghana, we used the Ghana Stock 
Exchange (GSE) as our source of data. Currently, the GSE has 40 firms listed on it. However, some of 
the firms listed do not have complete financial statements. Based on this, we used 28 firms that have 
complete financial information needed for our investigation. This number constitutes 70% of the total 
number of firms listed on the GSE. The firms cut across all sectors, ranging from the financial services 
sector to the extractive and manufacturing sector of the economy. Our data span from 2007 to 2014 
                                                     
1 See (Huang & Song, 2006; Akhtar & Oliver, 2009).  
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thus giving us a total number of 224 as our panel observations. The data was extracted from Mc 
Gregor dataset which hosts the financial statements of all African listed firms.  
3.2. Variables 
Following our review of literature, we have got our dependent variables which represent capital 
structure to be our long-term debt ratio and short-term debt ratio. Each of these two variables is 
examined in two ways. We first measured long-term debt and short-term debt in terms of complete 
book values of debt and equity followed by a second measure where they are both examined using the 
book values of debt and market values of equity1. The independent variables here are the determinants 
of capital structure which we have examined above in our literature. Full description of all the 
variables is found on table 1 below. All the definitions of our variables follow previous empirical 
works2  
Table 1. Definitions of Variables 
Variables Code  Definition 
Dependent Variables   
Y1 Long-Term Debt Ratio LD Long-term debt/(long-term debt + book value of equity) 
Y2 Short-Term Debt Ratio SD Short-term debt/(short-term debt + book value of equity) 
Y3 Market Value of Long-Term Debt MLD Long-term debt/(long-term debt +market value of equity) 
Y4 Market Value of Short-Term Debt MSD Short-term debt/(short-term debt + market value of 
equity) 
   
Independent Variables   
X1 Profitability ROA Profit before interest and tax/total assets 
X2 Age AGE Number of years since the firm incorporation 
X3 Size SIZE Total Assets 
X4 Business Risk RISK Standard deviation of profit before interest and tax 
X5 Asset Structure TAN Fixed assets/total assets 
X6 Non-Debt Tax Shield NDTS Depreciation/total assets 
X7 Growth Opportunities GROW (Total assetst – total assetst-1)/ total assetst-1 
X8 Managerial Ownership MO Shareholdings of directors/total equity 
X9 Liquidity LIQ Current assets/current liability 
3.3. Empirical Model of Estimation 
The use of panel data is noted to have several merits over time series or cross section data (Hsiao 2003 
and Klevmarken 1989) thus we employed panel data framework in our analysis. Our basic panel 
model is in the form: 
= ɸ + α +         (1) 
Where ɸ is a constant, Xi,t is a K-dimensional vector of explanatory variables and εi,t  is the error term 
which is further decomposed into the following disturbance terms; 
= +         (2) 
Following the works of Abor and Biekpe (2007) and Abdou et. al (2012) with modifications, we 
modeled our study as follows: 
                                                     
1 We could not use market values for debt due the lack of data on the market values of debt. The market values for the 
equities were sourced from the share prices of each firm.  
2 See (Titman & Wessels, 1988; Abor & Biekpe, 2007; Akhtar & Oliver, 2009; Sheikh & Wang, 2011; Abdou et al, 2012).  
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 = + + + + + + 
 + + + +        (3) 
 
 = + + + + + + 
 + + + +        (4) 
 
 = + + + + + + 
 + + + +        (5) 
 
 = + + + + + + 
 + + + +        (6) 
 
Where            (7) 
vi = individual firm effects  
Several panel estimators including OLS, fixed effect, random effect, PSCE, 2SLS and GMM could be 
employed in testing our hypotheses. However in estimating our model, we first of all considered the 
possibility of endogeneity existence as the expected determinants of capital structure could also be 
impacted by the capital structure. For instance, it is highly plausible that variables such as profitability, 
managerial ownership and liquidity could also be influenced by the capital structure thus there are a 
possibility of bidirectional causality and hence endogeneity caused by simultaneity is envisaged. The 
presence of endogeneity would make OLS, fixed effect, random effect and PSCE estimations 
inconsistent and produce bias results. In this instance we were left with 2SLS and GMM to use. With 
the absence of valid instruments which are cardinal requirements of the 2SLS, we adopted the General 
Method of Moments (GMM) in our estimation. Following the works of Alhassan et al (2014) which 
indicates that difference GMM introduced by Arellano and Bond (1991) as argued by Blundell and 
Bond (1998) and Alonso-Borrego and Arellano (1999) has lower predictive ability in small sample 
with small time period as ours we have adopted the system GMM. The system GMM of Arellano and 
Bover and Blundell and Bond (1998) arguably has a higher predictive ability in small time period data 
like our data and thus is more efficient than the difference GMM. To obtain robust results using the 
system GMM, the lagged values of the explanatory variables are used as instruments. The validity of 
the instruments in our model is checked using the Sargan test for over-identified restrictions.  
 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1. Descriptive Statistics 
From our descriptive statistics shown below in table 2, on the average firms in Ghana used more 
equity financing than debt financing. Comparing long-term debt with short-term debt, more short –
term debt is used in the financing of firms than the long term debt. On the book values, while the 
average short term debt ratio is 0. 43, the long term debt ratio is as low as 0. 20. The over reliance on 
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equity market and the short-term debt usage could be attributed to the lack of bond market in the 
country and possibly the high cost of debt thus firms prefer to use the equity in financing their 
operations. One of the variables worth analyzing is the liquidity of the firms. While we have 9. 81 
being the maximum figure for the liquidity, 1. 37 is the average ratio for the liquidity. This means that 
most of the firms are highly liquid and that could account for the reason of lower debt than equity 
since they will find it cheaper using the available funds within the firm to carry out their operations as 
against going outside the firm to seek funding by way of debt.  
On the ownership of the equity by managers, averagely only 5% of ownership belong to directors. 
This means that most of the firms have got ownership not majorly resting on directors. This however 
can lead to agency cost problems since the directors manage the day to day operations but do not have 
majority stake in the ownership. On the contrary side, the maximum directors’ shareholding is 95% of 
total equity. This means that modern corporate governance principles are not adhered to completely in 
some of the firms thus giving way for few people to hold majority of the shares in limited liability 
company traded on the stock exchange. As expected, the average tangibility rate is only 27% of total 
assets. This can be attributed to the fact that majority of the firms in our sample belong to the financial 
service sector where fixed asset is not a major concern. The low tangibility could also account for the 
low long term debt as collateral security is a major requirement in most long-term debt. There is a 
great dispersion on the size of firms. While the lowest firm has GH₵323,000, the maximum size is 
GH₵1. 32e+12 and this has accounted for the great standard deviation of GH₵8. 93e+10. On 
profitability, it is realized that only 2% is earned as return on asset while 39% is the highest return on 
asset.  
On the correlation matrix, it is realized that the highest coefficient of correlation is 0. 68 which is 
between non-debt tax shield and business risk. It means therefore that there is no multi-correlation 
problem among our dependent variables. All our variables can therefore be fitted into one model 
without any estimation problems.  
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean S. D Min Max Obs 
LD 0. 20 1. 16 -16. 04 2. 64 223 
ST 0. 43 0. 36 -0. 47 0. 98 223 
MLD 0. 48 0. 97 0 6. 34 180 
MSD 2. 98 5. 98 0 46. 05 180 
ROA 0. 02 0. 21 -2. 53 0. 39 223 
AGE 34. 67 25. 14 1 118 224 
SIZE 9,830,696 8. 93e+07 323 1. 32e+09 223 
RISK 0. 04 0. 09 0. 0001 0. 88 194 
TAN 0. 27 0. 26 0. 003 0. 86 223 
NDST 0. 03 0. 03 0 0. 19 223 
GROW 0. 25 0. 84 -1 10. 62 195 
MO 0. 05 0. 16 0 0. 95 224 
LIQ 1. 37 1. 33 0. 05 9. 81 223 
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Table 3. Correlation matrix 
 
 
4.3. Discussion of Regression Results 
Presented below in table 4 are the regression results of our dynamic system GMM. The results are 
categorized into two i. e the results based on the book values of debt and again based on market values 
of debt ratio. From our results, all lagged values of our dependent variables are statistically significant 
implying that dependent variables are influenced by their previous year performances. Expectedly, 
profitability is negatively significant with long-term debt but not significant with short term debt using 
the book values measure. Using the market measure however, profitability is negatively significant 
with both long-term debt and short-term debt ratio hence we are not able to reject both hypotheses H1a 
and H1b. This is in line with the pecking order theory which argues that firms with available retained 
earnings will prefer using that for their operations as against going outside for debt. The results serve 
as confirmation of previous empirical findings1.  
Non-debt tax shield is found to be significant with only short-term debt but not significant with long-
term debt. Thus we are not able to reject our hypothesis H6b. We however have no evidence to accept 
or reject hypothesis H6a. We are therefore not able to find any evidence to support previous studies that 
established that non-debt tax shield is negatively significant with long-term debt (Abor, 2008; Akhtar 
& Oliver, 2009). Asset structure is also found to strongly influence debt ratio. As expected, firms with 
higher fixed assets have high long-term debt while firms with low fixed assets have high short-term 
debt. This is in line with theory and supported previous studies that firms with fixed assets are able to 
collateralize their assets for long-term debt and hence has the chance of getting long-term debt. 
Surprisingly, liquidity is found to be positively significant with long-term debt but has a negative 
relationship with short-term debt. This is contrary to the pecking order theory which argues that firms 
with available funds will prefer to use internal funds as against the usage of debt. It however implies 
that firms with high liquidity are seen as credit worthy firms so credit holders are willing to grant such 
firms long-term debt. The inverse relationship between liquidity and short-term debt implies that firms 
that have high liquidity will not go in for short-term debt but rather will go in for long-term debt. It 
thus means that most firms probably go in for short-term debt to enable them settle current liabilities 
but use long-term debt for long term investment.  
                                                     
1 See (Titman & Wessels, 1988; Sharpe, 1995; Huang & Song, 2006; Abor & Biekpe, 2007; Abor, 2008; Akhtar & Oliver, 
2009; Sheikh & Wang, 2011; Pratheepan & Banda, 2016).  
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Managerial ownership is also established to be positively significant with debt using both the long 
term and the short term measures of debt. These findings thus support the agency cost theory by Jesen 
and Meckling (1976) and Jesen (1976) who argued that with the presence of managerial ownership in 
equity, sub-optimal investments are avoided thus credit holders are willing to grant debts to firms with 
higher managers ownership. While our findings support the work of Bokpin et al. (2009), they 
however contradict some previous findings (Huang & Song, 2006; Abor, 2008). Our findings again 
indicate that growth opportunity is a key determinant of capital structure. From the findings we are not 
able to reject our hypotheses that growth relates negatively with long-term debt. This lends support to 
the argument of both the trade-off and agency theory that growing firms do not collateralize their 
assets and also permit sub-optimal investment choices by managers thus are not able to attract debt 
especially long-term debt. While it confirmed the works of Akhtar and Oliver (2009) and Huang and 
Song (2006), it contradicts the findings of Pratheepan and Banda (2016) who established positive 
relationship between leverage and growth opportunities on the listed firms of Sri Lanka.  
Business risk is realized to have a significant inverse relationship with short-term debt. This implies 
that as the risk of the firm increases its long-term debt decreases while the short-term debt rises. It is a 
strong confirmation of Abor (2008) who found negative relationship with the long-term debt but had a 
positive relationship with short-term debt. In direct contradiction of theory and the findings of Abor 
(2008), we have found that age of a firm has negative correlation with both short-term and long-term 
debt. This could be attributed to old firms’ ability to rely on their retained earnings or have higher 
reputation to raise equity cheaper than younger firms hence the neglect of debt as source of financing 
their operations. Expectedly, size of a firm is found to significantly influence both long term and short-
term debt positively. The bigger a firm is in terms of asset, the higher the amount of debt it has. This is 
possible as big firms are more transparent with information and hence have higher trust worthiness 
than smaller firms that are usually associated with information asymmetry problems. This support 
several previous studies (Huang & Song 2006; Abor & Biekpe, 2007; Akhtar & Oliver, 2009; Sheikh 
& Wang, 2011; Pratheepan & Banda, 2016).  
Table 4. System GMM Regression Results 
Independent 
Variables 
Dependent Variables 
 Book Values Market Values 
 LD SD MLD MSD 
LD lagged(-1) -0. 371***    
 (0. 00848)    
SD lagged(-1)  0. 452***   
  (0. 0369)   
MLD lagged(-1)   0. 164***  
   (0. 0122)  
MSD lagged(-1)    0. 359*** 
    (0. 0106) 
ROA -1. 641*** 0. 107 -0. 560*** -0. 953*** 
 (0. 384) (0. 0738) (0. 177) (0. 290) 
NDTS -1. 580 1. 801*** -0. 866 -2. 358** 
 (1. 338) (0. 374) (0. 588) (0. 946) 
TAN 0. 471** -0. 705*** 1. 445*** 0. 477 
 (0. 201) (0. 136) (0. 276) (1. 105) 
LIQ 0. 332*** -0. 0721*** 0. 236*** 0. 362*** 
 (0. 0475) (0. 0143) (0. 0672) (0. 119) 
MO 0. 282*** 0. 384*** 2. 671*** 2. 089*** 
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 (0. 0667) (0. 104) (0. 142) (0. 513) 
GROW -0. 0739*** 0. 00136 -0. 0481*** 0. 380*** 
 (0. 0196) (0. 00377) (0. 00907) (0. 0417) 
RISK -3. 412*** 0. 474*** -0. 284 0. 748 
 (0. 937) (0. 0654) (0. 325) (1. 032) 
Log of AGE -0. 695** -0. 202*** -0. 346* 0. 491 
 (0. 274) (0. 0498) (0. 193) (1. 643) 
Log (SIZE) 0. 201** 0. 0879*** 0. 391*** 0. 722*** 
 (0. 0889) (0. 0253) (0. 0547) (0. 229) 
Constant -0. 183 -0. 0448 -3. 990*** -9. 761** 
 (0. 448) (0. 194) (0. 477) (4. 786) 
Waldχ2 25440817[0. 
0000] 
19916. 14[0. 
0000] 
217744. 91[0. 0000] 34044. 92[0. 0000] 
Sargan Test:     
Prob> χ2 0. 6769 0. 8337 0. 1686 0. 4311 
AR(1) p-value 0. 3035 0. 0082*** 0. 1514 0. 1750 
AR(2)p-value 0. 3467 0. 1132 0. 1200 0. 2461 
Observations 166 166 126 126 
Number of Firm 28 28 27 27 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0. 01, ** p<0. 05, * p<0. 1 
4.4. Robustness Checks 
We have recognized the critical influence endogeneity, autocorrelation and heteroscesdasticity 
presence in a model have on results produced from such models and hence we have employed one of 
the best possible procedures in our analysis so as to obtain robust results. We employed the system 
GMM in our estimation. System GMM has the predictive power in small time period data as against 
the difference GMM. Besides, the system GMM is able to produce efficient and consistent results in 
the presence of endogeneity, autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. Before using the system GMM, 
we first of performed instruments validity check by using the Sargan test and as indicated in table 4, 
the Prob> χ2 values are all greater than 10% and thus we are not able to reject the null hypothesis that 
over identifying restrictions are valid. We again performed Arellano-Bond test to determine if there is 
second order autocorrelation in our model. As indicated in table 4, AR (2) p-values are all above 10% 
and thus the null hypothesis cannot also be rejected that there are no second order autocorrelation. 
This implies that the model is properly specified and hence is robust for the estimation. Besides, we 
have collaborated our results of the book value measure of our debt with the market value measure of 
the debt. Most previous studies have only examined the capital structure by using only the book value 
measure of the debt. We however examined the capital structure using both book and market measures 
and as indicated in table 4, with the exception of business risk which is statistically significant with 
debt on the book value but is not significant with debt on the market value, all other variables have 
almost the same results thus making our estimation more robust and devoid of biasness.  
 
5. Conclusion and Policy Recommendations 
The study investigated empirically the determinants of capital structure on Ghanaian listed firms. 
Using a robust dynamic panel system GMM, the study established that all our independent variables 
are important elements in determining the capital structure of a listed firm in Ghana. First we realized 
that firms in Ghana use less debt than equity and use more short-term debt than long-term debt in their 
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operations. Secondly, we realized that the tangibility of firms, liquidity, managerial ownership and 
size of a firm have got positive relationship with long-term debt ratio. This indicates that firms in 
Ghana that have high fixed assets, high liquidity, large amount of assets and higher management 
ownership have high long-term debt ratio. This means that collateralization and trust on managers’ 
ability on wise investment are crucial for accessing long-term debt.  
Thirdly, we established that profitability, growth opportunities, age and business risk have inverse 
relationship with long-term debt. This indicates that firms that have growth opportunities and are more 
distress are risky firms hence have low attraction of long-term debt. Furthermore, older and profitable 
firms prefer to rely on their retained earnings to finance their operation as against debt. This is directly 
in line with the pecking order theory. Finally, we noted that non-debt tax shield, managerial 
ownership, business risk and size have direct significant relationship with short-term debt whereas 
tangibility, liquidity and age are found to have negative significant relationship with short-term debt in 
Ghana. Based on these we recommend the following: 
Government and policy makers should endeavor to develop our bond and other long term debt markets 
to enable firms that have the ability and want to balance their capital structure with debt to be able to 
do so. Currently, it is the government alone that issues bonds mostly into foreign countries due to the 
undeveloped nature of our bond market. Issuing bond into foreign country may be too costly for 
private firms to do so hence there is the need to develop our local bond market for firms to have 
choices in their financing.  
Secondly, Ghana is one of the countries in Africa with high interest rates and this has negative 
implications on cost of borrowing. Higher cost of borrowing has made some firms to avoid debt in 
their operations. This could be averted if Bank of Ghana puts in critical monetary policies so as to 
stabilize the economy and hence reduce our cost of borrowing to give way for many firms to engage in 
debt as alternative or supplementary sources of finance as capital is one of the cardinal determinants of 
firm success in developing countries. Thirdly, as noted above managerial ownership has been very 
crucial to capital structure. We therefore recommend policy makers on code of governance should 
make binding for all directors of firms to have ownership in the firm so as to avoid sub-optimal 
investment which is negative to debt attraction.  
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